Local Government Law by Murchison, Kenneth M.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 51 | Number 2
November 1990
Local Government Law
Kenneth M. Murchison
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 51 La. L. Rev. (1990)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol51/iss2/5
Local Government Law
Kenneth M. Murchison*
Federal and state courts handed down a typical array of local
government law decisions during the past year. Most continued prior
doctrinal patterns, and the citations in the remaining paragraphs of this
introduction list the most important of them. However, one area-
litigation affecting governmental employees-produced opinions of con-
siderable significance on both federal and state levels. The United States
Supreme Court extended its decisions barring the discharge of public
employees for political affiliation to forbid a variety of other patronage
practices in public employment;' the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized
a limited right to strike for public school teachers;2 and state courts of
appeal issued conflicting decisions regarding the relationship between
criminal charges and disciplinary actions against public employees who
are protected by civil service laws.' This article analyzes each of these
developments.
Several other cases involving local governments as litigants also
generated noteworthy decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In
cases raising first amendment issues, the Court reemphasized the im-
portance of standards to limit the discretion of individuals who issue
permits for activities that can impact freedom of speech 4 and construed
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1. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990); see infra notes 62-92 and
accompanying text.
2. Davis v. Henry, 55 So. 2d 457 (La. 1990); see infra notes 93-138 and accompanying
text.
3. Compare Department of Culture, Recreation, & Tourism v. Seifert, 560 So. 2d 492
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (employee's indictment for job-related misconduct was not sufficient.
by itself to support employee's suspension where the agency failed to offer other evidence
of the misconduct) and Caldwell v. Caddo Levee Dist., 554 So. 2d 1245 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 126 (1990) (criminal charges that are dismissed cannot form
the basis of a job dismissal) with Department of Pub. Safety & Corrections v. Hooker, 558
So. 2d 676 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (state's entry of nolle prosequi on criminal charges did
not preclude civil service disciplinary action against state employee based on same facts); see
infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text.
4. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 110 S. Ct. 596 (1990) (ordinance regulating the
deleterious secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on the community violates first
amendment because it does not require municipality to make a decision on license application
within a specified and reasonable time nor provide for prompt judicial review of municipality's
licensing ordinance).
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the federal Equal Access Act to require a public high school to allow
a religious group to use a classroom for meetings before the school
day.' Important procedural decisions included rulings that an interstate
compact creating a port authority waived the eleventh amendment im-
munity from federal jurisdiction" and that a state court could not apply
state law doctrine of sovereign immunity in a case brought in state court
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 7 The Court also reaffirmed the broad
remedial power of the federal courts to require whatever steps are
necessary to redress denials of equal protection,8 but precluded the use
of contempt sanctions against local legislators until remedies against the
governmental body had been shown to be ineffective. 9 Finally, one denial
of certiorari is especially noteworthy. On remand from a 1987 decision
holding that compensation is required for "temporary" regulatory tak-
ings, 10 the California courts found that no taking had occurred, and
the Supreme Court declined to review the merits of the state court
decision. I I
Decisions from the federal courts of appeals covered a much broader
variety of subjects. A number of cases attempted to define the procedural
S. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) (Equal Access Act requires
public high school that allows student groups to use facilities for approved non-curriculum
related activities to allow religious group to use classroom for meetings outside of instructional
hours).
6. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 110 S. Ct. 1868 (1990).
7. Howlett v. Rose, 110 S. Ct. 2430 (1990) (state doctrine of sovereign immunity is
not available to school boards in state court action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the defense
would not be available had the action been brought in federal court).
8. Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (federal district court may order a local
school district, as an essential element of a desegregation decree, to levy propery taxes at a
rate adequate to fund remedial order and may enjoin operation of state laws that would
have prevented school district from exercising this power).
9. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990) (district court abused discretion in
imposing contempt fines on individual council members who refused to vote in favor of
remedial legislation contemplated in constant decree to which city had agreed without first
imposing fines against city alone and allowing reasonable time for fines to elicit city's
compliance).
10. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987, Local
Government Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 303, 311-13 (1987).
11. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App.
3d'1353, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1989) (interim ordinance
that temporarily prohibited property owners from reconstructing buildings destroyed in flood
or building new ones was not a taking because it did not deny landowner all economically
viable use of land). See also Moore v. City of Costa Mesa, 886 F.2d 260 (9th-Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2588 (1990) (although state court found that conditional variance
invaded owner's property rights, the invasion was of insufficient magnitude to require com-
pensation under the eminent domain clause of the Federal Constitution).
12. E.g., Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 540 (1989)
(Illinois statute grants police officers only procedural rights and thus does not create a property
interest protected by the due process clause).
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and substantive 3 protections that the Constitution provides for public
employees. Other important decisions applied the market participation
exception to the dormant commerce clause to waste disposal facilities
owned by local governments, 4 invalidated an ordinance that allowed a
local government to deny a waste disposal permit on the basis of public
opposition," confirmed that rent control ordinances could amount to
inverse condemnation, 6 required a trial on a 1983 claim by a student
who was allegedly 7 abused sexually by a public school teacher, 8 ruled
that a state statute requiring 25 percent of the property owners in an
area to be incorporated to sign the petition seeking incorporation as a
municipality violated the equal protection clause, 9 and explored a variety
13. Town of Hull v. Miller, 878 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 501
(1989) (votes by members of municipal redevelopment authority on controversial housing
project for elderly constitute expression of opinion for which they cannot be removed);
Kirkland v. Northside Indep. School Dist., 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2620 (1990) (teacher's substitution of his own reading list for official curriculum list
without obtaining administrative approval does not involve protected speech on a matter of
public concern); Flannagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989) (police officers'
ownership of video store that rents non-obscene, sexually explicit videotapes involves interest
in free speech that outweighs city's interest in avoiding disruption of its relationship with
public, and thus it cannot provide basis for disciplinary action against officers). See generally
Rynard, The Public Employee and Free Speech in the Supreme Court: Self-Expression, Public
Access to Information, and the Efficient Provision of Governmental Services, 21 Urb. Law.
447 (1989); Annotation, Public Employee's Right of Free Speech Under Federal Constitution's
First Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 97 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1989).
14. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir., 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1127 (1990) (county's policy of charging less for landfill disposal of wastes
generated within county and nearby counties than for waste generated outside that area falls
within market participant exception to dormant commerce clause).
15. Geo-Tech Reclamation Indust., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662 (4th Cir. 1989) (statute
allowing denial of solid waste facility permit on basis of adverse public sentiment is uncon-
stitutional because it bears no substantial or rational relationship to state's interest in promoting
public welfare).
16. Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1990)
(allegation that rent control ordinance and statute barring park operators from requiring
tenants to remove mobile homes when they are sold operate to transfer valuable possessory
interest in rental space to tenants states a claim of taking by physical occupation).
17. Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 840 (1990) (student who was sexually abused by teacher may maintain 1983 action
against school district and school officials for their actions in maintaining policy, practice,
or custom of reckless indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual abuse of students
by teachers).
18. Curran v. Muller, 889 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1121 (1990).
19. E.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990) (public
transit authority regulations banning begging and panhandling in any transit facility do not
violate first amendment); Guadiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1369 (9th
Cir. 1990) (ordinance that requires non-profit organizations to obtain peddler's permit to sell
message-bearing merchandise violates first amendment because it vests unbridled discretion in
1990] 263.
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of ways in which the first amendment limits local regulatory power.20
The subject matter of the Louisiana decisions covered nearly all
aspects of local government law. As usual, the largest groups of cases
involved the status of public servants and tort liability.
The discussion that follows analyzes the Louisiana Supreme Court
decision that recognized a limited right to strike for public school teachers
and the decisions of the courts of appeal defining the relationship
between disciplinary action under civil service laws and criminal pro-
secutions. The supreme court also held the presumption of intoxication
in the Criminal Code does not apply in a civil service disciplinary action, 2'
and the courts of appeal addressed a host of other issues involving
officers and employees of local governments. A number of appellate
cases reviewed the merits of dismissals 22 and other disciplinary actions23
against civil service employees. Other significant decisions analyzed the
procedures applicable to disciplinary actions, explained how constitu-
tional protections interacted with protections provided by state statutes
or local ordinances,24 described what remedies were required to redress
government officials to deny expressive activity); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness
of New Orleans, Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1989) (ordinance
prohibiting solicitation from occupants of any vehicle on any street or roadway does not
violate first amendment because it is content-neutral, is narrowly tailored to serve significant
governmental interest in promoting traffic safety, and allows ample alternate channels of
communication).
20. Gray v. Department of Police, 545 So. 2d 537 (La.) (mem.), rev'g 543 So. 2d 525
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
21. E.g., Tweedel v. Fire Protection Dist. #1 Civil Serv. Bd., 546 So. 2d 654 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1989) (fire fighter's dissemination of contents of suicide notes he had observed during
investigation warranted one-month suspension, but not discharge); Alford v. Sewerage & Water
Bd., 543 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (employee's statement that supervisor was
going to find himself in a pool of blood constituted a threat sufficient to justify discharge).
22. E.g., Cittadino v. Department of Police, 558 So. 2d 1311 (La: App. 4th Cir. 1990)
(evidence that officer offered to sell illegal gaming machines provided legal cause for 120-
day suspension); St. Martin v. Department of Police, 558 So. 2d 247 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1990) (dismissal of police officer could not be sustained where department failed to establish
that officer was present when battery of arrestee took place or that officer was untruthful
when he denied knowledge of the incident); Board of Commr's v. Livingston, 546 So. 2d
259 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (reprimand that was not administered by proper appointing
authority was null and could be set aside in appeal from civil service commission); Tafaro
v. Department of Police, 552 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 553 So. 2d 861
(1989) (civil service commission abused its discretion in ordering sergeant's demotion for
intimidation and neglect of duty); Neustadter v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 544 So. 2d 1289
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (three-day suspension was warranted where evidence showed that
employee's repeated late arrivals impaired board's efficiency).
23. Polite v. Department of Welfare, 543 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (employee
cannot be disciplined for reason other than the one set forth in the notice of disciplinary
action).
24. Faught v. City of Alexandria, 560 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (due process
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errors in disciplinary actions,25 and construed the authority of civil service
and pension boards with respect to nondisciplinary rulings. 26 Issues raised
in cases involving teachers and other school employees included the
authority of a school board to reduce the pay of an absent teacher 27
and enforcement of a strike settlement agreement 2 as well as the pro-
tections afforded by tenure laws. 29
did not require hearing prior to police officer's suspension and demotion); McLaughlin v.
Jefferson Parish School Bd., 560 So. 2d 585 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (failure to conduct
bus driver's post-discharge hearing within 45 days as required by statute did not deprive bus
driver of due process); Webb v. Department of Safety & Permits, 543 So. 2d 582 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1989) (dismissal was invalid when employee did not receive adequate predismissal
notice and the opportunity to respond to charges against her); cf. Casse v. Sumrall, 547 So.
2d 1381 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1322 (1989) (due process does not
require that a state employee be given a hearing prior to implementation of layoff); Murray
v. Department of Revenue & Taxation, 543 So. 2d 1150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (postdischarge
hearing does not cure due process defect arising from failure to provide state civil service
employee with a predischarge hearing).
25. E.g., Coleman v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 557 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990)
(decision not to enforce reinstatement order was not arbitrary where former employee implicitly
declined offer of reinstatement by waiting four years to seek enforcement of order); Scrantz
v. Baton Rouge Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 543 So. 2d 1105 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (civil service board had discretion to limit backpay order where hearing had been
delayed at the employee's request).
26. In re Investigation of Lauricella, 546 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
548 So. 2d 330 (1989) (civil service commission lacked jurisdiction to impose a fine on
president of levy district's board of commissioners who was not a classified civil servant);
Nicolay v. City of New Orleans, 546 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.
2d 1324 (1989) (statute requiring city to fund fire fighter's retirement plan on an actuarily
sound basis required city to allow plan to maintain $5.8 million in reserves); In re Civil
Serv. Comm'n Layoff Investigation, 546 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551
So. 2d 1324 (1989) (determination that fire fighters who were rated by individuals who had
been their supervisors for less than 90 days had been treated fairly was erroneous in light
of commission manual requiring 90 days supervision for rating); Welch v. Department of
Personnel, 554 So.2d 296 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (personnel board had no jurisdiction to
consider employer's appeal of promotion denial absent an allegation of discrimination based
on "race, religion, politics, or other specified cause unrelated to merit-employment consid-
erations"); Walker v. Department of Pub. Works Sewerage, 549 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1989) (allegation that employee was denied merit raise because he was collecting worker's
compensation was sufficiently specific to invoke personnel board's appellate jurisdiction).
27. Piper v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 552 So. 2d 460 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), writ
denied, 556 So. 2d 36 (1990) (school board was not entitled to deduct from absent teacher's
pay the amount paid to full-time regular employee who was assigned teacher's duties).
28. St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. St. John the Baptist School Bd.,
556 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (amounts reinstated teachers were due under strike
settlement agreement could be reduced by the unemployment benefits they received).
29. Gaulden v. Lincoln Parish School Bd., 554 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 559 So. 2d 126 (1990) (remediation is not required prior to dismissal of tenured
teacher for reasons other than incompetency); Abbot v. Claiborne Parish School Bd., 550
So. 2d 294 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 553 So. 2d 475 (1989) (contract teacher who
was paid with federal funds was not covered by Teacher Tenure Law or by school board
policy for reduction in force).
1990]
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The Louisiana Supreme Court handed down four tort decisions in
litigation involving governmental defendants. Three of the four reflected
a sympathetic attitude toward accident victims. The court held a school
board liable for a student's injuries that were caused by the school's
negligent failure to repair a drinking fountain ° and held a city liable
for injuries a motorist sustained when she lost control of her car after
the vehicle struck a cross drain.3 In addition, the opinion in a lawsuit
against the state narrowly construed the "discretionary function" ex-
emption from liability that the legislature had recently granted to gov-
ernmental defendants. 2 The one exception to the pro-plaintiff trend was
a decision indicating that an attorney could be held personally liable
for a bad faith attempt to seize the property of a local government to
satisfy a tort judgment.3
The tort decisions of the courts of appeal are more numerous and
are less reflective of a common trend. Three types of issues appear
most frequently: problems of causation,3 4 the standard of care required
under Article 2315,11 and the scope of strict liability under Article
30. Morris v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 553 So. 2d 427 (La. 1989).
31. Crowell v. City of Alexandria, 558 So. 2d 216 (La. 1990).
32. Fowler v. Roberts, 556 So. 2d 1 (La. 1989) (discretionary function exception to
governmental liability did not immunize Department of Public Safety for issuing license
to driver subject to seizures).
33. Penalber v. Blount, 550 So. 2d 577 (La. 1989) (attorney is liable to police jury
for wrongful seizure if seizure was intentional, knowing, and in bad faith).
34. E.g., Conerly v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 557 So. 2d 1041 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1368 (1990) (where driver entered blind intersection without doing
everything possible to look around corner for approaching cars, city was not liable for
her injuries); Steward v. Spears, 557 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 560
So. 2d 14 (1990) (city's alleged misplacement of stop sign too far back of curb was not
proximate cause of intersection accident); Jones v. Williams, 557 So. 2d 262 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 607 (1990) (city was not liable under negligence claim
for its alleged lack of enforcement of parking violations at intersection); Nichols v. Nichols,
556 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ not considered, 561 So. 2d 92 (1990) (police
department's failure to send officer to husband's home after husband reported that his
wife had threatened to kill him if he returned home was not legal cause of husband's
shooting death where husband walked into house knowing his wife was there); Edwards
v. State, 556 So. 2d 644 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990) (deputy sheriff's unreasonable failure
to observe prisoner during visit to dentist that permitted escape was a breach of a custodial
duty and renedered sheriff liable for injuries arising out of abduction that occured two
days later at a location 20 miles away).
35. E.g., Reed v. Arthur, 556 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (town was not
negligent in failing to remedy defective stop sign at intersection); Brooks v. Orleans Parish
School Bd., 560 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (school board's supervision of
elementary school playground was adequate to preclude imposition of liability for student
who fell or was pushed from sliding board); Jones v. Williams, 557 So. 2d 262 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 607 (1990) (city not liable under La. Civ. Code
art. 2317 for its alleged lack of enforcement of parking violations at intersection); Ratcliff
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2317.36 Other significant cases applied comparative negligence principles
to a claim based on Article 667, 37 held the property of a clerk of court
exempt from seizure,38 sympathetically defined the force that a police
officer could use to retrain a prisoner,39 analyzed when governmental
bodies were liable for failure to perform police power duties, 40 and
v. Town of Mandeville, 551 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 37
(1989) (plaintiff failed to prove that town was negligent in operation of town dock);
McGowan v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 555 So. 2d 472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (failure
to cover catch basin despite reports of defect supported jury attributing 82016 of fault to
board); Williams v. Peterson, 551 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 552 So.
2d 386 (1989) (city had no duty to erect traffic signals at intersection); Vantrige v. Lloyd's
of La. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 603 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (city's failure to replace stop
sign at intersection despite notice that it had been missing for four weeks constituted
negligence that caused automobile accident); Tortorich v. Jefferson Parish Dep't of Pub.
Util., 543 So. 2d 1103 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (evidence concerning debris on water
meter box was insufficient to establish that parish was negligent).
36. E.g., Fragala v. City of Rayville, 557 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 561 So. 2d 103 (1990) (city was not liable where plaintiff failed to show actual
or constructive notice of vice or defect in barbecue pit as required by La. R.S. 9:2800(B));
Smith v. City of New Orleans, 557 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (city, but not
water and sewerage board, was liable for pedestrian's injuries that resulted from defect
in sidewalk); Jones v. Williams, 557 So. 2d 262 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 558
So. 2d 607 (1990) (city was not liable under strict liability claim for its alleged lack of
enforcement of parking violations at intersection); Ratcliff v. Town of Mandeville, 551
So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 37 (1990) (conflicting
testimony supported trial court's decision that town dock was not unreasonably dangerous);
Smith v. Zimmer, 553 So. 2d 919 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff failed to establish
that traffic light was malfunctioning at the time of accident).
37. Pelt v. City of DeRidder, 553 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (comparative
negligence principles applied to action seeking damages for backup of sewer system into
apartment buildings).
38. Bulot v. Justice, 552 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So.
2d 1124 (1990) (clerk of district court is a public officer of the particular political subdivison
where the office lies and thus the property of and funds generated by the office are
public funds exempt from seizure). Earlier decisions had established that property of local
governments was exempt from seizure. See La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C); Foreman v.
Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986, 988 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 339
So. 2d 846 (1976); see also De Laureal Eng'rs, Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury,
406 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (1982); Penalber
v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 407 So. 2d 1189 (1981);
Fontenot v. State Dep't of Highways, 355 So. 2d 1324 (La.) (mem.), rev'g, 346 So. 2d
849 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). The De Laureal Engineers and Penalber cases are discussed
in Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982, Local Government Law, 43 La. L.
Rev. 461, 487-89 (1982); Fontenot is analyzed in Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term, Local Government Law, 39 La. L. Rev. 843,
869-71 (1979).
39. Evans v. Hawley, 559 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 563 So. 2d
1156 (1990) (officer's pushing of arrestee back into chair did not constitute unreasonable
1990]
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explained when the protections of statutes providing immunity for prop-
erty owners applied to local governments.' In addition, decisions from
the fourth circuit narrowly defined the parameters of potential liability
for individual public servants .
42
Three other areas also produced sizeable groups of state decisions.
Opinions construing the public records laws generally continued the
tradition of broadly construing the Louisiana statute. 43 In land use cases,
use of force even though arrestee missed the chair and struck the floor or wall with his
head).
40. Guidry v. Airport Authority, 558 So. 2d 300 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (deputy
employed by authority did not owe duty to arrest motorist, or to prevent him from
driving home, based on his intoxication); Zeagler v. Town of Jena, 556 So. 2d 978 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 560 So. 2d 14 (1990) (husband's request that police officer
accompany him to house where plaintiff was allegedly with another man did not create
individual relationship with officer and plaintiff that required officer to protect plaintiff
from harm); Talamo v. Johnston, 554 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (summary
judgment was inappropriate where issues of material fact existed as to whether building
code imposed special duty on inspector and whether inspector owed the duty to the
plaintiff individually).
41. Montevill v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 554 So. 2d 692 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1989), writ granted, 559 So. 2d 1354 (1990) (recreational use immunity statutes relieved
parish of liability for damages plaintiff suffered while launching a boat at launch owned
by the parish); see also Singletary v. Crown Zellerbach, 554 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1989) (riding three-wheel vehicle is an activity that falls within the scope of the
recreational use immunity statute).; cf. Holder v. Louisiana Parks Serv., 552 So. 2d 20
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 59 (1990) (clam shell covered campsite
at state park was instrumentality covered by recreational use immunity statute).
42. Donnell v. City of New Orleans, 557 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (statute
excluding a district attorney and his employees from seeking indemnity against the state
could not be applied retroactively); Anderson v. St. Bernard Parish, 543 So. 2d 537 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 546 So. 2d 1220 (1989) (members of police jury who were
acting in the course and scope of their employment were immune from liability with
respect to employee's injury incurred while working as a tractor operator); see also McCoy
v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 557 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 563 So.
2d 882 (1990) (teacher's coverage under private professional liability policy did not relieve
school board of its statutory obligation to defend the teacher in a suit brought by a
student).
43. Cormier v. Public Records Request, 553 So. 2d 806 (La. 1989) (evidentiary hearing
was required to determine whether letters pertaining to alleged police misconduct were
records of pending criminal litigation that were not subject to disclosure where records
had been placed in criminal files of letter writers); Association for Rights of Citizens v.
Parish of St. Bernard, 557 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (custodian who failed
to respond in writing within three days was liable for plaintiff's attorney fees); Rowley
v. Buell, 552 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), remanded on other grounds, 556 So.
2d 50 (1990) (traffic tickets by named police officers were public records that custodian
could be ordered to. produce); but see Angelico v. Cannizzaro, 543 So. 2d 1064 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1989) (special grand jury report prepared in connection with sales tax
investigation was not a public record required to be released to news media). For other
opinions continuing the trend of broad construction in decisions reported after the end
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the supreme court recognized a broad power to lease to private parties
property that had previously been dedicated to public use," and both
the first. and fourth circuits rendered significant decisions in zoning
litigation. 4 Disputes over public contract decisions produced a number
of decisions from the courts of appeal. They limited a school super-
intendent's employment contract to the term of the school board that
executed the contract," reemphasized the importance of complying with
the technical requirements of a bid solicitation, 47 recognized broad dis-
cretion of local governments to reject all bids submitted for a public
works contract, 4 and limited a contractor's damages in a contract re-
cision action to the contract price. 49
of the period covered by this survey, see State v. Nicholls College Found., 564 So. 2d
682, (La.), rev'g 558 So. 2d 1-232 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (district court erroneously
granted summary judgment holding. that records of private foundation were not subject
to the records law); Gannett River States Publishing v. Hussey, 557 So. 2d 1154 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 103 (1990) (records identifying applicants for
position of fire chief of the city were public records and did not qualify for the "personnel
exception" to the public record law).
44. Coliseum Square Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 544 So. 2d 351 (La. 1989) (on
rehearing) (city council's decision to lease one block of city street to private interest for
60 years was not arbitrary or capricious).. But cf. Lake Terrace Property Owner's Ass'n
v. City of New Orleans, 556 So. 2d Ill (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 559 So. 2d
1382 (1990) (city could not alienate walkway that it had acquired pursuant to building
restrictions requiring that it remain public).
45. Brown v. City of New Orleans, 560 So. 2d 983 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (property
operated as business did not lose its nonconforming use status due to casual, intermittent,
or temporary use because it was not vacant for six months within the meaning of the
zoning ordinance); Aucoin v. City of Mandeville, 552 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (neither issuance of license by building inspector nor petition for appeal to zoning
board interrupted time for appealing zoning board's determination that use of property
as a commercial property was a permitted use within zoning district); Miller v. Knorr,
553 So. 2d 1043 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (private plaintiff did not have to prove irreparable
injury as a prerequisite to obtaining injunction to abate violation of zoning ordinance);
Villavicencio v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 543 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989)
(lack of valid liquor license does not terminate a bar's existing nonconforming use status).
For an important supreme court zoning decision rendered after the closing date for this
year's symposium, see Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482 (La.
1990) (rezoning action is a legislative action that need not be supported by evidence in
the adminstrative record).
46. Hayden v. Richland Parish School Bd., 554 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 559 So. 2d 124 (1990) (superintendent's employment contract ended by
operation of law at the end of the term of office of the school board which executed
the contract).
'47. Stafford Constr. Co. v. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 560 So. 2d 558 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1990) (failure of successful bidder to attach corporate resolution authorizing
signing proposal to bid form rendered bill null and void).
48. Thigpen Constr. Co. v. Parish of Jefferson, 560 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1990) (where both advertisement for bids and contract reserved authority to reject any
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The remaining state cases cover a variety of subjects. The supreme
court upheld the legislature's power to use local laws to create and to
control a fire protection district located in a parish that is organized
pursuant to a home rule charter,50 required local officials to provide
notice and a hearing before revoking a liquor license, 5 and confirmed
the authority of the city of New Orleans to levy a municipal inheritance
tax.5 2 The courts of appeal refused to allow a municipality to escape
liability for coroner fees by declining to adopt an ordinance setting the
amount of the fees, 5  recognized the power of a police jury to remove
and to replace members of a parish port commission that had been
created by state law,5 4 ruled that a budget request for "office equipment"
was not sufficiently specific to trigger any duty a police jury might have
to furnish the clerk of court with a computer system," declared that
the certificate of the registrar of voters in an annexation proceeding
was prima facie proof that the proper percentage of registered voters
had consented to the annexation,56 defined the parish coroner as an
and all bids, trial court was not authorized to order the public entity to award the
contract to another bidder); cf. Roe v. State, 560 So. 2d 474 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ
denied, 564 So. 2d 326 (1990) (state decision to cancel bid solicitation was not arbitrary
when it could not determine which of the two bids was lower); Department of Transp.
& Dev. v. Standard Constr. Co. of Georgia, 550 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 559 So. 2d 120 (1990) (anticipation of inability to fund proposed project
was just cause for rejection of all bids).
49. Dupre v. City of Opelousas, 553 So. 2d 1086 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (when
city rescinded demolition order after contract had been let, contractor was entitled to bid
price but not to loss of expected profit from sale of salvageable materials from demolition).
50. Bayou Cane Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 548 So.
2d 915 (La. 1989) (legislative authorization of a fire protection district was neither an
impermissible local act nor a forbidden interference with the structure and organization
of parish with a home rule charter).
51. Paillot v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758 (La. 1990) (suspension of beer and liquor
permits and occupational license without prior notice and hearing denied bar owner due
process); cf. Caracci v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 556 So. 2d 1249 (La. 1990)
(post-penalty hearing is sufficient to satisfy due process for penalty imposed by racing
stewards).
52. Hildebrand v. City of New Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1476 (1990). For an explanation of the special taxing power conferred on the
city of New Orleans, see Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, Local Gov-
ernment Law, 49 La. L. Rev. 367, 388-93 (1988) (analyzing City of New Orleans v.
Scramuzza, 507 So. 2d 215 (La. 1987)).
53. Reynolds v. City of Pineville, 546 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
551 So. 2d 631 (1989).
54. McIntosh v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 554 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1989).
55. Post v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 554 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
56. LeBlanc v. City of Lafayette, 543 So. 2d 1040 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
548 So. 2d 337 (1989).
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official who was statutorily entitled to defense by the attorney general
in a civil action arising out of the performance of his official duties, 7
held that a deputy clerk of court was not a "public officer" for purposes
of an exception contained in a statute prohibiting retaliatory discharges,"
clarified the scope of local sales and occupational taxes,5 9 refused to
invalidate an action for technical violations of the Open Meetings Law, 6
and confirmed the power of a municipality to mandate the removal of
utility facilities, upon the expiration of the utility's franchise.6'
PATRONAGE Hmn.JO
Since 1976, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the
freedom of association implicit in the first amendment limits the power
of local governments to fire employees because of political affiliation.
The seminal decision was Elrod v. Burns .6  In Elrod, a majority of the
Court ruled that the Constitution prohibited a local government from
making party affiliation a condition for continued employment of a
bailiff, a security guard, and three individuals who worked in the process
division of a sheriff's office. The majority failed, however, to agree on
a single opinion explaining its holding.63
57. Polkey v. City of New Orleans, 557 So. 2d 405 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
559 So. 2d 1375 (1990).
58. Robin v. Galan, 545 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
59. E.g., Intracoastal Pipe Serv., Co. v. Assumption Parish Sales & Use Tax Dep't,
558 So. 2d 1296 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted in part on other grounds, 563 So. 2d
863 (1990) (cleaning of oil field drilling tubing was not subject to local sales tax); Jack/
Wade Drilling Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 558 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 560 So. 2d 29 (1990) (tax ordinance that gave taxpayer credit for "amount
of tax imposed" by another local taxing unit granted credit based on dollars paid rather
than on a percentage basis); Town of Lutcher v. Lewis, 552 So. 2d 1323 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1989) (town had authority to impose occupational license tax the amount of which
was based on daycare center's gross sales).
60. Daigre v. Terrebonne Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 543 So. 2d 1108 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 548 So. 2d 333 (1989) (technical violations of open meetings law
did not require reversal of executive director's discharge when director had actual notice
of the meeting and director attended meeting with his attorney).
61. Valley Elec. Membership Corp. v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 550 So. 2d
702 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1341 and 1342 (1989).
. 62. 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976). See Note, Elrod v. Burns: Constitutional
Job Security for Public Employees?, 37 La. L. Rev. 990 (1977).
63. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion advocated "[I]imiting patronage dismissals to
policymaking positions." 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S. Ct. at 2687. This limitation would, he
asserted, adequately protect the governmental interest served by patronage-preventing
representative government from being "undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation
of policies... presumably sanctioned by the electorate." In a concurring opinion that
Justice Blackmun joined, Justice Stewart suggested a test that appeared to leave more
room for patronage dismissals; he proposed extending the constitutional protections only
to "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential" employees. 427 U.S. at 375, 96 S. Ct. at 2690
(Stewart, J., concurring).
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Four years later, Branti v. Finkel" produced a majority opinion
that affirmed Elrod and extended it in two important respects. First,
Branti refused to limit the constitutional protection to cases where the
governmental employer expressly required the employee to affiliate with
a particular party; instead, it held that the Constitution prohibited all
discharges based "solely" on an employee's failure to affiliate with a
particular party or to obtain a sponsor from the party.6 5 Second, Branti
broadened the class of governmental employees who were protected by
the prohibition against dismissals based on political affiliation. According
to the Branti majority, the prohibition applied to all positions except
those where "the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved.""
Elrod and Branti left unanswered the question of whether the rule
banning dismissals based on political affiliation would also invalidate
other forms of patronage. Courts of appeals uniformly refused to extend
the Elrod-Branti principle to public contracts, 67 but split as to how it
applied to employment decisions other than dismissals. The Second and
Third Circuits ruled that Elrod and Branti prohibited relying on party
affiliation in any disciplinary action against a governmental employee,
6
but the Fourth and Seventh Circuits held that the Supreme Court pre-
cedents only applied to employment decisions that were the functional
equivalent of dismissal.6 9
64. 445 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in
the Law, 1979-80, Local Government Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 500-05 (1981).
65. 445 U.S. at 516-17, 100 S. Ct. at 1293-94.
66. 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S. Ct. at 1295.
67. Horn v. Kean, 796 F.2d 668 (3d Cir. 1986) (en banc); LaFalce v. Houston, 712
F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044, 104 S. Ct. 712 (1984); Fox & Co.
v. Schoemehl, 671 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1982); Sweeney.v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S. Ct. 174 (1982). See generally Comment, Political
Patronage in Public Contracting, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 518 (1984).
68. Lieberman v. Reisman, 857 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1988); Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d
723 (3d Cir. 1987). In addition, dicta from a Sixth Circuit decision upholding an informal
patronage hiring system that did not explicitly rely on political affiliation indicated that
Elrod and Branti would preclude hiring policies based "solely" on political affiliation.
Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233, 234-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 106 S.
Ct. 3276 (1986), noted in, Note, Republicans Only Need Apply: Patronage Hiring and
the First Amendment in Avery v. Jennings, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1374 (1987). For a summary
of the Lieberman, Bennis and Avery holdings, see Comment, Patronage-and the First
Amendment: A Structural Approach, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1369, 1375-77 (1989). '
69. Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, 110 S.
Ct. 2729 (1990); Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980). Dicta in another
decision of the Seventh Circuit, Hermes v. Hein, 742 F.2d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1984), had
suggested that Elrod and Branti might bar relying on political affiliation in promoting
decisions, but the Court denied relief in Hermes because the plaintiffs had failed to prove
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The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the circuits by broadly
construing its earlier decisions. In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,70
that political affiliation was the cause of their being denied promotions. For summaries
of the decisions of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, see Comment, supra note 68, at
1373-75, 1377.
70. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
Justice Stevens authored a concurring opinion that responded to three propositions
advanced by the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia. In rebutting each of the propositions,
Justice Stevens quoted extensively from Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d
561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 93 S. Ct. 1364 (1973), a pre-Elrod opinion
that he authored as a circuit judge. First, he distinguished the constitutional requirement
from a civil service system on substantive and procedural grounds. Substantively, the
Constitution "does not provide job security, as such, to public employees;" it only prohibits
"discharge for a particular impermissible reason." Procedurally, the constitutional mandate
does not "require the state to follow any set procedure or to assume the burden of
explaining or proving the grounds for every termination." 110 S. Ct. at 2740 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (quoting Lewis, 473 F.2d at 567-68). Second, Justice Stevens categorically
rejected the suggestion that "traditional practices are immune from constitutional scrutiny."
Such an approach would, he asserted, have "doomed to failure" the "constitutional attack
on racial discrimination." Moreover, it was inappropriate with respect to the specific
.problem before the Court in Rutan because the long toleration of patronage practices
was based in substantial part on a discredited doctrine-the assumption "that since a
public employee has no constitutional right to his job, there can be no valid constitutional
objection to his summary removal." 110 S. Ct. at 2741 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Lewis, 473 F.2d at 568 & n.14). Third, Justice Stevens cited a number of free speech
cases that antedated Elrod to contradict the claim that, prior to Elrod, "it was unthinkable
that patronage could be unconstitutional." 110 S. Ct. at 2742 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Relying on these cases, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 2697
(1972), had offered the following summary of the rule they established:
For at least a quarter century this Court has made clear that even though a
person has no "right" to a valuable governmental benefit . . . there are some
reasons upon which the government may not act. It may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests....
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion challenged the majority on three grounds: the con-
stitutional methodology on which Elrod and Branti were based, the validity of the Elrod-
Branti approach under the majority's own balancing approach, and the application of
the Elrod-Branti principles to the employment practices that were challenged in Rutan.
The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy joined the dissent in its entirety, and Justice
O'Conner indicated her agreement with its second and third points. 110 S. Ct. at 2746-
58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
On the methodological point, the dissent urged greater deference to political tradition
in the development of implied constitutional rights. According to Justice Scalia, the Court
has "no proper basis" for striking down "practices not expressly prohibited by the text
of the Bill of Rights" when the practices bear "the endorsement of a long tradition of
open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic."
Judicial activism in these areas is inappropriate because the traditions "are themselves
the stuff out of which the Court's principles are to be formed." Thus, they form "the
very points of reference by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other practices are to
be figured out." Id. at 2748 (emphasis in original).
Justice Scalia also claimed that Elirod and Branti were wrongly decided "[e]ven accepting
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a five-member majority applied the patronage ban to forbid governmental
employers from relying on party affiliation in a broad array of personnel
decisions including promotions, transfers, recalls from layoffs, and initial
hirings.
The first sentence of Justice Brennan's majority opinion anticipated
its conclusion. "To the victor," Justice Brennan declared, "belong only
those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained." '7' He then proceeded
to construe the Constitution to impose stringent limits on a political
victor's ability to favor political supporters in government employment
decisions.
Justice Brennan began his analysis with the claims of existing em-
ployees. He quickly rejected two arguments for treating promotions,
transfers, and layoff recalls as "different in kind" from the dismissals
involved in the Supreme Court decisions. First, the claim that the em-
ployees in Rutan had "no entitlement to promotion, transfer, or rehire"
was "beside the point." The plaintiffs in Elrod and Branti had no
"legal entitlement to continued employment," and thus the absence of
such entitlements in Rutan was irrelevant. 72 Second, the argument that
the promotion, transfer, and rehire decisions did not "chill" the exercise
of constitutional rights by employees was "not credible." Employees
the Court's own mode of analysis." Initially, he argued that the majority's "strict-scrutiny
standard" was inconsistent with previous decisions recognizing that the government was
normally held to a less rigid reasonableness standard when its employment rather than
its regulatory practices were being challenged. Judged by this reasonableness standard,
the Elrod-Branti principle and its extension in Rutan were improper because the Court
gave insufficient weight to the governmental interests served by patronage. Not only did
the majority fall to give appropriate weight to the long patronage tradition, but its
"categorical" rejection of patronage "reflect[ed] a naive vision of politics and an inad-
equate appreciation of the systematic effects of patronage in promoting political stability
and facilitating the social and political integration or previously powerless groups." Id.
at 2749-58.
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that, even if Elrod and Branti were not overruled, they
should not be extended to the patronage practices involved in Rutan. The basis for the
earlier decisions was the "retraint" that patronage dismissals placed "on freedoms of
belief and association," and that retraint was "an appreciably greater constraint" when
the employer was threatened with the loss of "current livelihood" than with "the failure
to obtain a promotion or selection for an uncongenial transfer." Having recognized the
significance of the distinction "between firing and other employment decisions in other
contexts," the Court "should do so here as well." Id. at 2758 (citing Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S., Ct. 1842 (1986)).
71. 110 S. Ct. at 2731.
72. Id. at 2735-36. This approach is consistent with the analysis the Court has used
in procedural due process cases. The Court has ruled that the Constitution only imposes
procedural limits on the discharge of public employees when the employees have an
independent guarantee of tenure. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985). For an analysis of Louisiana cases applying Loudermill
to individuals protected by civil service laws, see Murchison, supra note 10, at 322-27.
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who desire promotions "will feel a significant obligation to support
political positions held by their superiors, and to refrain from acting
on the political views they actually hold, in order to progress up the
career ladder." Those denied transfers to more convenient workplaces
"will feel a daily pressure from their long commutes" to conform to
the political views of their supervisors. The impact on those who have
been laid off is likely to be even greater; they "may well feel compelled
to engage in whatever political activity is necessary to regain regular
paychecks and positions corresponding to their skill and experience.""
Because the promotion, transfer, and rehire decisions implicated "the
same First Amendment concerns" that led to the decisions in Elrod and
Branti, Justice Brennan found the concerns "equally applicable" to the
practice challenged in Rutan. In his view, choosing certain high-level
employees on the basis of their political views would "adequately" serve
the "government's interest in securing employees who will loyally im-
plement its policies." Similarly, he found the argument that patronage
was necessary to preserve the democratic process unpersuasive because
"other, less intrusive and equally effective methods" exist to nurture
political parties and because "patronage decidedly impairs the elective
process by discouraging free political expression by public employees." 74
Finally, Justice Brennan turned to the "closely related question" of
whether Elrod and Branti also forbade relying on party affiliation in
hiring governmental employers. Because "denial of a state job is a
serious deprivation," he concluded that "[p]atronage hiring places bur-
dens on free speech and association similar" to those imposed by the
use of patronage considerations in other employment decisions. Thus,
"conditioning hiring on political belief and association plainly constitutes
an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a vital interest
in doing so." Not surprisingly, the majority found "no such government
interest here, for the same reasons that we found the government lacks
justification for patronage promotions, transfers, or recalls." 7 1
Analytically, the logic of Rutan is an unremarkable extension of
Elrod and Branti. The Court was undoubtedly correct in asserting that
the patronage practices involved in Rutan are likely to influence the
political affiliation of governmental employees who are subject to them.
If, as the majority claimed, a patronage system makes no vital or unique
contribution to the preservation of the democratic order, the govern-
mental interest in using patronage considerations in hiring, promotion,
transfer, and recall decisions is no stronger than relying on patronage
as a grounds for dismissal. Furthermore, the Court grounded the dis-
73. 110 S. Ct. at 2736.
74. ld: at 2736-37.
75. Id. at 2738-39.
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missal precedents on the impact on associational interests rather than
on the interference with an employee's reasonable expectation of con-
tinued employment. Rutan's similar focus on the impact on association
interests is thus consistent with the approach of these decisions.
Some affirmative action cases have distinguished dismissals from
other types of employment decisions,7 6 but those cases have assumed
that the existing employees were, at most, innocent beneficiaries of past
discriminatory practices. None of them have suggested that the protec-
tions would also extend to those who have actively participated in
discriminatory employment decisions of the past. To allow patronage
hiring while protecting the recipients from patronage dismissals would
be more analogous to forbidding affirmative action programs from
displacing individuals who had actively sought and received particular
benefits from discriminatory employment practices.
77
Of course, the logical consistency of Justice Brennan's opinion does
not eliminate all objections to Rutan. The premise that the contribution
of a patronage system to democracy is insubstantial remains as debatable
as when it was first announced in Elrod, and Justice Brennan makes
little effort to demonstrate the proposition in his latest opinion.7 Echoing
the earlier dissents of Justice Powell, 79 Justice Scalia's opinion provides
impressive support for the position that the premise is sufficiently un-
certain that the political process should define the scope of the patronage
system.8 0 But, as Justice Scalia's dissent recognizes, those objections
76. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
77. Justice Brennan dismissed Wygant as having "no application" to the questions
presented in Rutan. In his view, Wygant's distinction between existing and prospective
employees arose from its concern that the affirmative action use "the least harsh means"
to satisfy the government's duty to remedy past wrong. By contrast, Rutan did not involve
"a remedial undertaking," and so the court did not have "to consider whether not being
hired is less burdensome than being discharged." Because no remedial duty presses the
government to hire or to discharge employees on the basis of political affiliation, the
issue in the patronage cases was "not which penalty is more acute but whether the
government, without sufficient justification, is pressuring employees to discontinue the
free exercise of their First Amendment rights." Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct.
2729, 2739 (1990).
78. See id. at 2737 (assertion that choosing high-level government employees on the
basis of their political views will adequately protect the governmental interest in securing
implementation of policies); id. at 2739 (assertion that government has no greater interest
in patronage hiring than in other employment decisions). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Stevens cited several studies rejecting the claim that patronage in government employment
contributes to the effectiveness of the democratic political system. Id. at 2744 n.4 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
79. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1296-97 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 378-79, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2692 (1976) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
80. 110 S. Ct. at 2749, 2752-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia is careful to
[Vol. 51
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
counsel- overruling Elrod and Branti rather than arbitrarily confining
their reach."'
Whatever its merits, Rutan is unlikely to provide the final word
with respect to the constitutional limitations on patronage practices.
Future litigation is likely to focus on the plaintiff's burden of proof
and the permissibility of relying on patronage to award public contracts.
Justice'Brennan's retirement might also prompt a reconsideration of the
entire line of patronage decisions.
Deciding the burden of proof that a plaintiff must satisfy to prove
a Rutan violation will determine the extent of its impact. Elrod and
Branti prohibited discharges "solely" because of political affiliation.8 2
That would be a daunting standard for plaintiffs to satisfy, especially
in hiring cases. But if patronage considerations serve no unique or vital
governmental purpose, it is difficult to see why government employers
should be allowed to give any consideration to political affiliation. At
a minimum, proof that patronage considerations were a substantial factor
in the employment decision should shift the burden to the employer to
demonstrate that the same decision would have been made if the in-
dividual's political affiliation had been ignored.83
In any event, statistical evidence will probably be a significant aspect
of future cases since knowledgeable employers are unlikely to declare
political affiliation as the basis for their decisions. If the Court follows
emphasize that his posiiton in Rutan was not an endorsement of the desirability of a
patronage system:
In emphasizing the advantages and minimizing the disadvantages (or at least
minimizing one of the disadvantages) of the patronage system, I do not mean
to suggest that that system is best. It may not always be; it may never be. To
oppose our Elrod-Branti jurisprudence, one need not believe that the patronage
system is necessarily desirable; nor even that it is always and everywhere arguably
desirable; but merely that it is a political arrangement that may sometimes be
a reasonable choice and should therefore be left to the judgment of the people's
elected representatives.
Id. at 2756 (emphasis in original).
81. See id. at 2756 (proper application of the majority's own balancing test "explains
why Elrod and Branti should be overruled, rather than merely not extended"). Of course,
Justice Scalia favored confining Elrod and Branti to dismissal cases rather than extending
it to the additional patronage practices involved in Rutan. Id at 2758.
82. Branti, 445 U.S. at 517, 100 S. Ct. at 1295; Elrod, 427 U.S. at 350, 96 S. Ct.
at 2673; cf. Avery v. Jennings, 786 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 106
S. Ct. 3276 (1986) (informal patronage system for governmental hiring did not violate
first amendment, but Constitution does forbid "official hiring policies based solely on
political affiliation") (emphasis added).
83. Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 265-66, 270 n.20, 97 S. Ct. 566 n.20 (1977) (proof that intentional racial discrimination
was "a motivating factor" in governmental decisions shifted burden to governmental entity
to prove that it would have made the same decision if the impermissible purpose had
never been considered).
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its employment decisions involving racial discrimination, 4 evidence of a
significant disparity between the political affiliation of the potential
applicant pool and of those affected by employment decisionss will
establish a prima facie case that shifts the burden of proof to the
employer. Moreover, one need not be excessively cynical to anticipate
that such a statistical disparity will exist in many, if not most, cases
in which politically selected officials have discretion as to whom they
are going to hire.
Rutan is also likely to invite a reexamination of the cases refusing
to impose constitutional limits on patronage contracting. One could
surely distinguish the contracting cases from the employment cases on
the ground that the employee has a more reasonable expectation of
continuing his or her governmental benefits, but Rutan has termed that
ground of distinction "beside the point" in employment cases.16 Instead,
Rutan focused on two considerations: a realistic assessment of whether
the government employment practices would impact an individual's first
amendment rights and a restrictive evaluation of the contribution that
patronage makes to ,the functioning of the political system. Undoubtedly,
the prospect of gaining or losing an important contract has influenced,
and will influence, the political associations of individuals whose busi-
nesses depend on government contracts.8 7 Thus, Rutan offers a strong
argument for banning patronage contracts unless a majority of the Court
changes its assessment of the value of patronage.
84. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v, Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971). Jury discrimination cases have also relied on statistical disparities
to shift the burden of proof, see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct.
1712 (1986); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32, 92 S. Ct. 1221, 1225-26
(1972), and other recent equal protection cases have also indicated that evidence of disparate
impact can allow the trier of fact to infer discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S. Ct. 3272 (1982); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
85. Recent employment cases involving racial discrimination have emphasized the need
to establish a disparity between the applicant pool and the group affected by the em-
ployment decision. A disparity with the minority percentage in the general population is
insufficient. Cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (to establish
prima facie case of racial discrimination, plaintiff must prove disparity between the
percentage of the minority hired and the minority percentage in the available labor pool;
proof of disparity between the percentage of minority hired and the minority percentage
of the population is insufficient).
86. Rutan v. Republican Party, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 (1990).
87. Although pre-Rutan decisions in the courts of appeals found that the use of
patronage to award contracts had less impact on first amendment rights than dismissals
of public employees, see, e.g., Horn v, Kean, 796 F.2d 668, 674-75 (3d Cir. 1986); LaFalce
v. Houston, 712 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1983), Rutan abandons any focus on the relative
severity of the impact on the rights of the individual.
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As the author of both Elrod and Rutan, Justice Brennan has been
the principal architect of the constitutional doctrine restraining patronage
practices in government employment. Because the Court has been closely
divided in all three patronage cases, 88 Justice Brennan's retirement at
the end of the October 1990 term suggests that reconsideration of the
entire doctrine is possible, and perhaps likely, since the four most recent
appointees all dissented in Rutan. If reconsideration is going to occur,
the first step will probably be a refusal to apply the doctrine in the
contract cases; and the response of contractors to the earlier decision
in Branti suggests that it will not be long before the Court will have
the opportunity to take that first step.
In Louisiana, Rutan's impact on employment practices of many local
governments is likely to be modest because civil service laws already
preclude patronage employment practices for their employees.8 9 Of course,
even where civil service laws exist, the constitutional claim provides an
additional argument for dissatisfied employees. Moreover, the protection
of civil service laws is not universal. All systems exempt some non-
classified employees from the protection of the civil services laws, and
those employees may receive the constitutional protections." In addition,
many smaller local governments lack civil service laws, and existing state
laws do not cover the employees of elected officials who operate in-
dependently of the parishes in which they are located. 91
Even where Rutan does require some modification in employment
practices, the uncertainty over burden of proof and the possibility of
reconsideration of the doctrine combine to suggest a cautious approach
to compliance. A simple system that instructs those with hiring, recall,
promotion, and dismissal authority to make notes of the basis for the
decision seems desirable, but more extensive requirements are probably
unnecessary since the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof. Good
88. Elrod, like Rutan, was a five-four decision; Branti had a six-member majority,
but it included Chief Justice Burger who, having dissented in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 375, 96
S. Ct. at 2690, presumably concurred in the later case on the basis of stare decisis.
89. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 1 (creation of civil service systems of the state
and the city of New Orleans); id. § 14 (authority for parishes and cities with population
over 10,000 to join the state system); id. § 15 (authority for the creation of city and
parish civil service systems); id. § 16 (creation of fire and police civil service system);
La. R.S. 33:711 (1988) (civil service system for cities with commission and city manager
form of government); 33:2391-:2433 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (creation of civil service system
for cities with a population in excess of 100,000).
90. For a survey of lower federal decisions that indicate the difficulty of determining
exactly what public servants are entitled to the constitutional protection, see Rutan, 110
S. Ct. at 2755-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A
Government Official's Guide to Patronage Dismissals, 39 Am. U.L. Rev. 11, 23-42 (1989).
91. See Murchison, supra note 64, at 502-04.
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government may counsel the adoption of a formal civil service system,
but the Supreme Court has not yet required it.92
STRIKE5 BY PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
Difficult economic times frequently lead to conflict between public
employees and the governments that employ them. Thus, one can hardly
find it surprising that Louisiana has recently experienced a number of
such conflicts-and the strikes that often accompany them.
In the past, Louisiana law has largely ignored labor conflict in the
public sector. Constitutional and statutory references address a few
matters, 93 but do not begin to provide a comprehensive system of col-
lective bargaining. 94 Supreme court cases have dealt only tangentially
with the right to strike issue,95 but decisions by two different courts of
appeal during the 1970's upheld the validity of lower court orders
restraining strike activities by public employees.9 6
Strikes by public school teachers have occurred in several Louisiana
parishes in recent years. 97 In the midst of a 1989 strike by teachers in
Terrebonne Parish, the school board sought a judicial declaration that
the strike was illegal and an injunction against its continuance.98 In
92. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Rutan describes some of the obvious ways
in which the constitutional requirements differ from the normal requirements of a civil
service system. See 110 S. Ct. at 2740 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union Council
34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 567-68 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 93 S. Ct.
1364 (1973)).
93. E.g., La. Const. art. X, § 10(3) (authority for political subdivisions to contract
with employee organizations); La. R.S. 23:890 (1985) (provision for collective bargaining
for local governments that operate public transportation facilities); La. R.S. 42:457 (1990)
(authority to withhold union dues of public employees). See generally Comment, Public
Employee Collective Bargaining in Louisiana, 34 La. L. Rev. 56, 60-67 (1973).
94. For a proposal that includes the draft of a collective bargaining statute for
Louisiana, see Comment, Public Employee Labor Organization, 21 Loy. L. Rev. 911
(1975). For an example of a comprehensive state statute regulating labor disputes in the
public sector, see Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
95. See St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. Brown, 465 So. 2d 674
(La. 1985) (refusing to allow a school board to call a referendum on whether the board
should engage in collective bargaining); Charbonnet v. Gerace, 457 So. 2d 676 (La. 1984)
(allowing air traffic controllers to recover unemployment compensation even though they
were engaged in a strike that was illegal under federal law).
96. City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n, 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 376 So. 2d 1269 (1979), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 64, at 505-08; Town
of New Roads v. Dukes, 312 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
97. E.g., Brown, 465 So. 2d 674 (lawsuit arising out of strike in St. John the Baptist
Parish); Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 22, 1990, at 7B, col. I (newspaper report
of New Orleans teachers' strike).
98. The board raised its claims in a reconventional demand to a lawsuit filed by the
teachers' union. The union sought monetary damages and an injunction prohibiting the
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Davis v. Henry," the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that the strike
was a legal one that the state's courts could not enjoin.
Chief Justice Dixon authored the opinion for the court in Davis.
In it he gave two very different rationales for the court's decision. One
rationale was procedural: construing the state's "Little Norris-LaGuardia
Act'"10 to apply to public employees, he found it denied Louisiana
.courts the power to enjoin the strike unless the strikers committed illegal
acts. The second rationale was substantive: distinguishing a fourth circuit
decision involving a police strike in New Orleans,' 0' he concluded that
teachers (and other public employees) have a right to strike except when
the strike clearly endangers public health or safety.
Before beginning his analysis in Davis, the chief justice articulated
the premise on which the court's decision was based. "Louisiana public
policy," as reflected in the state's "jurisprudence, statutes and consti-
tution," favored "the organization of and collective bargaining for both
public and private employees." Moreover, "the right to engage in peace-
ful picketing, work stoppage and other concerted activities" was
"[cloncomitant with" the organizational and bargaining rights. 0 2
The analytic portion of the Davis opinion began with an evaluation
of Louisiana's "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act." Patterned after the 1932
federal act authored by Senator Norris and Representative LaGuardia, 03
the Louisiana statute declares that "[n]egotiation of terms and conditions
of labor should result from voluntary agreement between employer and
employee." Because "[glovernmental authority has permitted and en-
couraged employers to organize in the corporate and other forms of
capital control," the Act proclaims the necessity "that the individual
workman have full freedom of association ... and that he shall be
free from the interference ... of employers . . . in the designation of
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purposes of collective bargaining.'9'1 4 The substantive provisions of
the Act forbid "yellow-dog" contracts'05 and restrict the authority of
the state's courts to issue restraining orders and injunctions in labor
school board from firing any striking employees. The district court denied relief to both
parties, but only the school board appealed. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 458 (La.
1990).
99. 555 So. 2d 457 (La. 1990). Three justices-Lemmon, Cole, and Marcus-concurred
without opinion.
100. La. R.S. 23:821-:849 (1985).
101. City of'New Orleans v. Police Ass'n, 369 So. 2d 188 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 376 So. 2d 1269 (1979).
102. 555 So. 2d at 459.
103. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1988); see Note, The Court Adds Life to the Little Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 1215, 1216-18 (1981).
104. La. R.S. 23:822 (1985).
105. La. R.S. 23:823 (1985).
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cases. The Act categorically bans the courts from enjoining eleven union-
related activities. 106 In addition, it generally forbids all injunctions in
cases growing out of labor disputes unless the court makes six specific
findings: (1) the existence or threat of illegal acts, (2) substantial and
irreparable harm to the complainant's property, (3) greater harm from
denying the injunction than granting it, (4) no injunction of activities
specifically protected under the act, (5) no adequate remedy by ordinary
legal procedure, and (6) failure of public officers to furnish adequate
protection for the complainant's property.101
The premise that Louisiana's public policy favors collective bar-
gaining for public employees guided the court's construction of the Act.
According to the chief justice, the policy declaration of the Act reflected
"clear legislative intent to protect all employees in the exercise of their
right to engage in concerted activities." Similarly, he construed the ban
on injunctions against union-related activities as providing "that all
persons are entitled to engage in [those] activities." Finally, he described
the special conditions placed on the power to grant injunctions in labor
cases as placing a "heavy burden" on those seeking injunctions. Al-
though the Act did not prohibit injunctions in labor disputes, it did
require compliance with the.statutory procedures and guidelines "before
that relief is available."'' 0
The school board conceded that no Louisiana statute forbids public
employees from striking. Nonetheless, it relied on a 1975 decision of
the first circuit holding the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to
strikes in the public sector'09 and the general rule in the United States
that "such strikes are illegal under the common law. '""0 The supreme
court rejected the first circuit decision as an erroneous aberration in
Louisiana law and also refused to outlaw all strikes by public employees.
Following the lead of a 1985 California decision," ' the supreme court
ruled that public employees possess a "right" to strike except when the
strike "clearly endanger[s] the public health and safety. '" 2
Davis began its explanation of the right of public employees to
strike with judicial decisions, constitutional provisions, and statutes rec-
ognizing other union-related rights of public employees. The 1974 Con-
stitution recognized the authority of state agencies and local school
boards to enter collective bargaining agreements with their employees
106. La. R.S. 23:841 (1985).
107. La. R.S. 23:844 (1985).
108. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 460-61 (La. 1990).
109. Town of New Roads v. Dukes, 312 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
110. 555 So. 2d at 461.
111. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Ass'n, 38 Cal.
3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 995, 106 S. Ct. 408
(1985).
112. 555 So. 2d at 461.
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who were represented by a union,11 3 as had decisions of the first and
fourth circuits rendered after the Constitution was adopted but before
it went into effect.' ' 4 The new constitution also forbade governmental
employers from discriminating against employees because of union mem-
bership,' and the Right-to-Work Law enacted in 1976 declared the
state's public policy "that all persons have ... the right, freely and
without fear of penalty or reprisal, to. form, join and assist labor
organizations." "1
6
Turning more directly to the right of public employees to strike,
the supreme court rejected the general rule forbidding strikes on the
ground that "Louisiana is not a common law jurisdiction and common
law jurisprudence is not binding in this state.""' Moreover, the court
noted that the refusal to embrace the common law rule was consistent
with the approach of most Louisiana decisions. When the fourth circuit
enjoined the strike by New Orleans police officers, it declined to answer
"the broad question of whether any public employee has the right to
strike." Instead, it adopted the narrowing reasoning that a police strike
was unlawful because it "not only leaves society defenseless against
crime but even inspires lawlessness.""' Similarly, the fifth circuit had
enforced an agreement ending a teacher's strike in St. John the Baptist
Parish,' 9 declaring that it was a valid agreement that brought "a lawful
strike and work stoppage" to an end. 20
113. La. Const. art. X, § 10(3).
114. La. Teachers' Ass'n v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974), writ denied, 305 So. 2d 541 (1975); Zbozen v. Dep't of Highways, 293
So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974). The voters approved the Constitution on April 20,
1974, and it was effective on January 1, 1975. The first circuit decided Zbozen on April
22, 1974; and the fourth circuit handed down its decision in Louisiana Teachers' Ass'n
on November 8, 1974.
115. La. Const. art, X, § 10(3).
116. La. R.S. 23:981 (1985) (emphasis in quotation in Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d
457, 462-63 (La. 1990)).
117. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 463 (La. 1990). This theme of rejecting the
common law has been a common one in Chief Justice Dixon's opinions. See, e.g., Cantrelle
Fence & Supply Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 515 So. 2d 1074 (La. 1988); Rozell v. Louisiana
Animal Breeders Coop., 496 So. 2d 275 (La. 1986); Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d
1071 (La. 1985); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633, 639 (La. 1981) (dissenting opinion);
Welch v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 359 So. 2d 154 (La. 1978). For an analysis suggesting
that Louisiana decisions differ less from those of other states than these denigrations of
the common law would suggest, see Murchison, The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian
Tradition: A Surprising Triumph For the American Influence, 49 La. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
118. 555 So. 2d at 463 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Police Ass'n, 369 So. 2d
188, 189 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 376 So. 2d 1269 (1979)).
119. St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. St. John the Baptist Parish
School Bd., 494 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 5th Cir.), remanded, 497 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1986),
modified after remand, 503 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987).
120. Id. at 555 (quoted in Davis, 555 So. 2d at 464).
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Turning to the supreme court's own decisions, the Davis opinion
acknowledged that "the legality of public employee strikes has been
only peripherally at issue" in them.' 2' Nonetheless, it cited two as
inconsistent with an absolute ban on all strikes in the public sector.
One allowed striking air traffic controllers to recover unemployment
compensation benefits even though they were participating in a strike
that was forbidden by federal law. 22 The other affirmed the authority
of a school board to bargain collectively without addressing the legality
of the strike that had given rise to the collective bargaining agreement. 23
The one exception to the general trend of the Louisiana decisions
was the first circuit's decision in Town of New Roads v. Dukes, 24 which
refused to apply the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act to a strike by municipal
employees. The supreme court declined to follow it on the ground that
its reliance on a United States Supreme Court decision construing the
federal act 25 was improper in light of the "plain words" of the Louisiana
statute. 126
The supreme court reached the correct result in Davis, but its
explanation of that result is ambiguous and contains considerable po-
tential for mischief in future litigation. The United States Constitution
grants public employees the right to join unions, 27 and the state's
constitution, statutes, and judicial precedents establish a policy that
authorizes collective bargaining by local governments. 28 State statutes
do not, however, provide guidance on the myriad issues that must be
resolved to implement a collective bargaining system. Without legislative
guidance, courts are ill-equipped to make the inevitable discretionary
judgments regarding such issues as recognition of bargaining agents, the
definition of bargaining units, and the scope of bargainable subjects.
Thus, the court was wise to confine its involvement with strikes by
public employees to ensuring that the strike does not endanger the health
or safety of the public.
The court's decision to rely on the Little Norris-LaGuardia Act was
unfortunate* in two respects. First, Davis' interpretation of legislative
intent was probably incorrect. Second, the limited injunctive relief the
121. 555 So. 2d at 464.
122. Charbonnet v. Gerace, 457 So. 2d 676 (La. 1984).
123. St. John the Baptist Ass'n of Educators v. Brown, 465 So. 2d 674 (La. 1985).
124. 312 So. 2d 890 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
125. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677
(1947), analyzed in Davis, 555 So. 2d at 465-67.
126. 555 So. 2d at 467.
127. See Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969); cf. Tassin
v. Local 832, Nat'l Union of Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975)
(right of public employees to picket). See generally Comment, supra note 93, at 56-58;
Comment, supra note 94, at 913.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 93, 104-07, 113-23.
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statute allows is directed at problems associated with strikes in the private
sector rather than those involved in strikes by public employees.
Three factors suggest that the Louisiana Act was not designed to
apply to strikes in the public sector: the source from which it was drawn,
the time in which it was enacted, and the language that it employs.
The state statute is virtually identical to the federal law and was adopted
just two years after the Congress passed the federal act. Forty years
ago, the .United States Supreme Court ruled, albeit in dicta, that the
federal act did not apply to disputes with federal employees,'2 9 a result
the Louisiana Supreme Court declined to follow because of the "plain
words" of the state statute and the lack of legislative history showing
an intent to exclude strikes by public employees. 130 Both the federal and
state laws were passed in the 1930's because of the extensive use of
injunctions in private labor disputes. At the time, few unions of public
employees existed, and no United States jurisdiction allowed strikes by
governmental employees.' Thus, the lack of an express exclusion of
governmental employees hardly supports the inference that the state
intended to grant them important new rights.3 2 Finally, the policy dec-
laration Chief Justice Dixon quotes contains its own refutation of his
interpretation of the Act. To justify, the protection of employee rights
to engage in "concerted actions," the policy statement emphasizes the
encouragement that "government authority" has provided to "employers
to organize in the corporate and other forms of capital control."' That
rationale is simply inapplicable to governments; at a minimum, it requires
a rejection of the chief justice's argument that the "plain words" of
the statute dictated the Davis result.
One would be less inclined to challenge the supreme court's ques-
tionable construction of the statute if it provided a useful framework
for guiding judicial intervention in strikes in the public sector. Unfor-
tunately, it does not. A finding that a strike was illegal because it
endangered the public health or safety would apparently satisfy the
requirement that the injunction be limited to the prohibition of "unlawful
acts."' 14 Even when a strike involves unlawful acts, however, the statute
expressly forbids any injunctive relief pertaining to eleven specific ac-
tivities. Among those activities are refusing to perform work, commu-
129. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S. Ct. 677
(1947).
130. Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 467 (La. 1990).
131. See Comment, supra note 94, at 912-15.
132. Some states did expressly exclude governmental employers. See Annotation, Right
of Public Employees to Strike or Engage in Work Stoppage, 37 A.L.R.3d 1147, 1152
(1971).
133. La. R.S. 23:822 (1985) (emphasis added).
134. La. R.S. 23:844 (1985).
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nicating information regarding the labor dispute, advising others to
participate in a refusal to work, or doing any of these things in concert.'35
The legislature apparently intended the categorical bans to preclude
injunctions that would prohibit a strike. Instead, the courts were to
confine themselves with enjoining only those illegal strike activities that
threaten irreparable harm to the defendant's property. In cases like
police strikes where the strike itself is the illegal activity, the courts will
face a dilemma. They must either dilute the categorical prohibitions of
the statute, which may reduce the protections available to employees in
the private sector; or they must disavow the power to protect public
health and safety when a strike threatens them.
Grounding the Davis opinion on the applicability of the Little Norris-
LaGuardia Act to public employers was particularly unfortunate because
it was unnecessary to reach the court's decision on the merits. Instead
of holding the statute binding in public sector strikes, the court could
simply have relied on it as further evidence of state policy favoring
collective bargaining. The court could then have implemented that policy
by refusing to interfere with strikes unless they threatened the public
health and safety. In this way, the court could have minimized judicial
oversight of strikes without confining that oversight to statutory pro-
visions that were designed for a different purpose.
The substantive basis for the supreme court's refusal to enjoin the
teachers' strike was the conclusion that the strike was legal. Once again,
the court's decision was a good one, but the rationale merits criticism.
Refusing to declare strikes illegal unless they threaten public health or
safety is consistent with the public policy favoring collective bargaining
and also with a recognition of the limited role the judiciary should play
in labor disputes. However, framing the issue in terms of a "right" of
public employees to strike is inconsistent with both reasons that justify
the court's decision.
If public employees are exercising a right to strike, the role for
collective bargaining is likely to be diminished. If the court had simply
confined itself to a declaration that the strike could not be enjoined
because it was not illegal, the parties would have been responsible for
the resolution of the dispute. Both sides would be free to use the
economic and political bargaining weapons at their command with the
ultimate substantive solution left to the parties. But if employees are
exercising a right, they are likely to seek judicial protection of attempts
by employers to interfere with those rights by dismissing them or reducing
their benefits during the strike period. 3 6 Because the right to strike is
135. La. R.S. 23:841 (1985).
136. Davis itself began because the union sought to enjoin the school board from
firing striking teachers, Davis v. Henry, 555 So. 2d 457, 458 (La. 1990); and news reports
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federally defined for employees in the private sector, 3 7 the basis and
scope of the public sector right that the court has created remain
extremely vague. 3 s As a result, the court has invited future litigation
concerning these issues.
More fundamentally, use of "rights" language undermines the lim-
ited role that the judiciary should play in labor disputes. The creation
and definition of rights has been a source of judicial activism in our
society. Federal and state statutes conferring collective bargaining rights
and restricting judicial interference with those rights provide impressive
evidence that courts were unsuccessful in supervising labor disputes in
the private sector. This past failure should caution modern courts from
embracing doctrines that will increase rather than reduce judicial over-
sight of labor disputes in the public sector.
In sum, the supreme court should continue the approach, but not
the rationales, of Davis. Following this course, the courts could maintain
the authority of public officials to protect health and safety without
assuming the responsibility of active supervision of all strikes by public
employees. A definitive solution to the problem ultimately will require
legislative action. Until the legislature chooses to act, the supreme court
should resist the temptation to try to fashion solutions to all of the
numerous problems presented by strikes in the public sector. Indeed,
piecemeal solutions may be counter-productive because they may release
some of the pressure for legislative action that would otherwise occur.
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AND CIVIL SERVICE DISCIPLINE
Like most jurisdictions in the United States, Louisiana has treated
criminal prosecutions and civil service disciplinary proceedings as entirely
distinct actions. Criminal conduct can form the basis for a disciplinary
action if the conduct constitutes "cause" that prejudices the civil service
or impairs its efficiency. 3 9 Arrest on criminal charges may justify the
initiation of an investigation of the alleged misconduct that led to the
arrest and a suspension pending the outcome of the investigation. Mere
of the recent strike by teachers in Orleans Parish indicated that the school board planned
to stop paying for the insurance coverage of strikers. Baton Rouge Morning Advocate,
Oct. 2, 1990, at 4B, col. 1 and Oct. 4, 1990, at 5B, col. 1.
137. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1988).
138. Particularly confusing is Chief Justice Dixon's reference to a Louisiana "statutory
scheme" that "creates for public employees a system of rights and protections which
closely mirrors those in the private sector." 555 So. 2d at 467. The National Labor
Relations Act defines the rights of employees in the private sector and creates a system
of administrative enforcement, and no comparable statute applies to public employees in
Louisiana.
139. E.g., Sanders v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 394 So. 2d 629
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 602 (1981).
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charges will not, however, support a disciplinary action unless the ap-
pointing authority proves the conduct that led to the criminal charges.1'
°
On the other hand, the lack of criminal charges does not preclude
disciplinary action against an employee who has been guilty of miscon-
duct. Not even an acquittal on criminal charges precludes the government
from disciplining an employee if it establishes the underlying misconduct
in a civil service proceeding.' 4'
The interrelationship between criminal prosecutions and civil service
proceedings arose in three cases decided by the first circuit in 1989-
1990, and the results they reached are not entirely consistent with the
framework described above. Although all three cases concerned em-
ployees in state civil service, their principles are equally applicable to
disciplinary actions under local systems.
Two of the decisions confirmed the distinction between criminal
prosecutions and civil service discipline. The first circuit reaffirmed the
government's right to discipline its employees regardless of the outcome
of criminal charges that arise from an incident. 42 At the same time,
the court refused to allow an indictment to form the basis for disciplinary
action without proof of the underlying misconduct that gave rise to the
charges. 43
Relying on a rule prohibiting employees from violating state law,,"
the Department of Corrections suspended an employee after he had been
arrested for illegally using a weapon in violation of Article 94 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code.' 4 The district attorney later dismissed the
charges, and the civil service commission reversed the suspension. The
commission ruled that dismissal of the criminal prosecution precluded
140. E.g., Noel v. Department of Sanitation, 490 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986);
Brown v. Louisiana Health & Human Resources Admin., 346 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1977); Floyd v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 283 So. 2d 537 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1973).
141. Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So. 2d 5 (1962); Daniels
v. New Orleans Police Dep't House of Detention, 236 La. 332, 107 So. 2d 659 (1958);
see also Petrus v. Guin, 378 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
142. Department of Public Safety & Corrections v. Hooker, 558 So. 2d 676 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1990).
143. Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism v. Seifert, 560 So. 2d 492 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1990).
144. Correction Services Rules & Procedures, Rule 13(o) (quoted in Hooker, 558 So.
2d at 677).
145. La. R.S. 14:94(A) (1986):
Illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities is the intentional
or criminally negligent discharging of any firearm, or the throwing, plac-
ing, or other use of any article, liquid, or substance, where it is foreseeable
that it may result in death or great bodily harm to a human being.
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the department from establishing the criminal violation that formed the
basis for the suspension. 46
Emphasizing the commission's "exclusive power to hear and [to]
decide all state civil service disciplinary cases," the first circuit reversed
and remanded the case to the commission for further proceedings. 47
Because conduct that violates a criminal statute can also constitute cause
for disciplinary action, the appellate court ruled that the outcome of a
criminal prosecution cannot preclude the commission from exercising its
exclusive power in a related disciplinary action. Precedents of the Louis-
iana Supreme Court had refused to give preclusive effect to the criminal
prosecution even though the defendant had been acquitted of the criminal
charges, 48 and the case for preclusion was even weaker in the case of
a dismissal, which "does not bar ... further prosecution unless jeopardy
has attached.' 49
The wisdom of the first circuit's decision is apparent. Dismissal of
criminal charges does not establish that no violation of state law oc-
curred, but merely that the district attorney decided that further pros-
ecution of the charge was not warranted.5 0 The prosecutorial decision
does not establish that disciplinary action under the civil service laws
is also unwarranted, and it should not preclude governmental employers
from taking disciplinary action with respect to the conduct that originally
gave rise to the criminal charges. The commission's ruling would have
resulted in preclusion whenever the appointing authority imposed an
investigatory suspension on the basis of criminal charges that were later
dismissed, and the first circuit was wise to reject it. Even if conduct
does not merit criminal prosecution, it may still adversely affect the
employment relation, as the case before the court illustrated. Suspension
was appropriate if the department could establish that the employee who
worked at the state prison had illegally used a weapon in violation of
the criminal code, and the decision to abandon the criminal prosecution
should not preclude the department from establishing the violation.
The second of the decisions reemphasized the other side of the
distinction between criminal prosecutions and disciplinary actions-the
146. 558 So. 2d at 678 (quoting decision of the Civil Service Commission).
147. Id. at 679 (emphasis in original).
148. See, e.g., Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So. 2d 5
(1962); Daniels v. New Orleans Police Dep't House of Detention, 236 La. 332, 107 So.
2d 659 (1958).
149. 558 So. 2d at 679 (citing La. Code Cr. P. arts. 691, 693); State v. Norwood,
351 So. 2d 122 (La. 1977).
150. Cf. Schexnayder v. New Orleans Police Dep't, 474 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1985) (describing how stricter burden of proof in criminal proceedings might incline
prosecutor to dismiss charges even though the preponderance of the evidence established
the charge).
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necessity that the governmental employer prove the existence of the
misconduct that justifies the disciplinary action. Following an employee's
indictment for a criminal violation related to his civil service employment,
the Department of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism suspended him.
The department later sought to extend the suspension because the crim-
inal charges against the employee had not been resolved, and the com-
mission scheduled a hearing on the extension. At the hearing, the
department offered no evidence relating to the conduct alleged in the
indictment, and the commission refused to extend the suspension.','
The first circuit affirmed the commission's decision, ruling that an
indictment was similar to an arrest for purposes of disciplinary action.
By itself, the indictment was insufficient to "constitute cause for dis-
ciplinary action," although it would support a suspension to enable the
appointing authority to investigate the alleged misconduct. Moreover,
the indictment alone could not justify an indefinite extension of the
suspension until the criminal charges were resolved. To support extension
of the suspension, the appointing authority must "furnish some factual
support for [the existence of] the alleged misconduct or reasons why
more time for investigation is necessary." Because the department offered
neither proof of the misconduct nor justification of the need for further
investigation, the commission properly refused to grant the extension.'52
Once again, the decision of the first circuit merits commendation.
An indictment is an allegation, not proof of a criminal violation. When
the allegation involves misconduct that impairs the efficiency of the
service, the formality of the indictment process justifies investigation of
the charge and temporary suspension of the employee until the appointing
authority has had an opportunity to determine the truth of the allegations
in the indictment. The investigatory suspension should, however, be
limited in length. The purpose of the suspension is to give the appointing
authority the opportunity to determine the need for disciplinary action,
not to transfer to the criminal justice system the responsibility for
determining the need for discipline. Thus, once the appointing authority
has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate the alleged misconduct,
it should have to establish the misconduct that gives rise to the need
for discipline. Moreover, the appointing authority cannot properly rely
on the indictment to carry that burden of proof. An indictment-like
151. The Civil Service Commission did grant one extension of the suspension on the
basis of unspecified "new evidence." Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism v.
Hooker, 560 So. 2d 492, 494 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990). However, it denied a second
extension when the counsel for the department stated at the hearing that he "had no
evidence to offer on the conduct charged in the letter of suspension and would rely solely
on the indictment itself as cause for the suspension." Id. (quoting findings of the com-
mission).152. Id. at 495.
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an arrest-is an allegation, not proof of the charge. In order to extend
the suspension on the basis of the misconduct alleged in the indictment,
the appointing authority must offer evidence that the misconduct oc-
curred. 
15 3
The third-decision is more troublesome. In it, the first circuit over-
turned a dismissal based on alleged off-duty misconduct that also gave
rise to three criminal charges. A jury convicted the employee on one
of the three charges, and the appointing authority dismissed him from
his civil service position. The Louisiana Supreme Court later reversed
the criminal conviction on evidentiary grounds,'5 4 and the court of appeal
reversed the civil service dismissal and ordered the employee reinstated
with back pay.'
The appellate court justified its decision on the "injustice" of dis-
missing the employee in light of the criminal proceedings. The allegations
in the criminal indictment "were the same as those" in the disciplinary
action, and the parties stipulated that their witnesses "would testify just
as they had at the criminal trial." Although the court acknowledged
that "the burden of proof in Civil Service Commission proceedings and
criminal charges is different," it nonetheless concluded that "it would
be an injustice for [the employee] to be exonerated of the criminal
charges brought against him, while allowing those same charges to form
the basis of his job dismissal.' 5 6
The first circuit decision deserves criticism on factual, doctrinal, and
policy grounds. Factually, it inaccurately characterized the results of the
criminal proceedings against the employee as well as the basis of the
disciplinary charges. Doctrinally, it ignored longstanding precedents of
the Louisiana Supreme Court as well as the first circuit's own decisions.
From the standpoint of policy, it unwisely equated civil service discipline
with criminal prosecution.
153. When the misconduct occurs while the employee is working, the appointing
authority need not offer independent evidence that the misconduct impaired the efficiency
of the service. It must, however, prove that the misconduct occurred. Id. at 496.
154. State v. Caldwell, 504 So. 2d 853 (La. 1987).
155. Caldwell v. Caddo Levee Dist., 554 So. 2d 1245 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ
denied, 559 So. 2d 126 (1990). Judge Savoie dissented. In his view, the administrative
record contained "unrebutted testimony" that the employee "had engaged in drug trans-
actions." Id. at 1250 (Savoie, J., dissenting). Moreover, he found that misconduct to be
sufficient cause for the employee's dismissal. "Although [the employee's] conduct did not
occur during work hours or on the defendant's premises, the conduct did involve a co-
employee .. " In light of this connection with the workplace, Judge Savoie was unwilling
to "say the Commission erred in inferring that the [employee's] ability as a supervisor
to 'command adherence from his subordinates to the ... rules of his employer is
significantly impaired."' Id. at 1252 (Savoie, J., dissenting) (quoting decision of the Civil
Service Commission).
156. Id. at 1247.
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The decision of the court of appeal incorrectly describes the factual
circumstances of the dismissal in two respects. It erroneously summarizes
the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in the employee's criminal appeal,
and it also mischaracterizes the basis for the disciplinary proceedings.
The supreme court decision in the criminal. appeal did not "exo-
nerat[e]" the employee. The court did rule that the trial judge erroneously
excluded exculpatory evidence, but it did not rule that the jury would
have, or should have, believed that evidence. Nor did the supreme court
order the charges dismissed; instead, it simply reversed the employee's
conviction 15  Even if the' prosecutor chose to dismiss the charges rather
than to retry the employee, the prosecutorial decision would only es-
tablish that the cost of another trial was not justified, not that the
employee did' not commit the crimes.'
The court also made a factual error with regard to the basis for
the disciplinary proceedings against the employee. In explaining why the
subsequent reversal of the criminal charges also required reversal of the
disciplinary proceeding, the court relied on cases that refuse to allow a
defendant's arrest to justify discipline without considering the validity
and ultimate disposition of the charges, the possible length of incar-
ceration, and the degree of resulting notoriety.' 9 But those decisions
were inapposite because the basis for the dismissal against the employee
was not the existence of the criminal charges, but the underlying conduct
that led to the criminal charges as well as the disciplinary proceedings.6
Doctrinally, the case rejects the well-established distinction between
criminal prosecution and civil service discipline. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has consistently refused to rely on the outcome of criminal pro-
ceedings to estop the government from taking disciplinary action based
on conduct that had also resulted in a criminal prosecution. Not even
an acquittal on the criminal charges precludes the appointing authority
from taking disciplinary action.161 Since the first circuit itself acknowl-
edged these precedents in another recent decision,1 62 principled decision-
157. 504 So. 2d at 856.
158. See Department of Public Safety & Corrections v. Hooker, 558 So. 2d 676 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1990) (analyzed at supra text accompanying notes 143-45; Schexnayder v.
New Orleans Police Dep't, 474 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985)).
159. 554 So. 2d at 1247 (citing Brown v. Louisiana Health & Human Resources
Admin., 346 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977)).
160. Id. at 1246 n.2 (quoting dismissal letter) ("[The incidents described in the letter]
constitut[e] a violation of written agency rule #2, which prohibits the use or illegal
possession of, or attempt to take part in the sale or illegal handling of drugs.").
161. See, e.g., Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So. 2d 5
(1962); Daniels v. New Orleans Police Dep't House of Detention, 236 La. 332, 107 So.
2d 659 (1958).
162. Hooker, 558 So. 2d at 679.
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making required something more than a vague allegation of "injustice"
to justify departing from them.
Moreover, sound policy reasons support the traditional authority
accepting the distinction between criminal prosecutions and disciplinary
actions. As the first circuit itself noted,'63 the burdens of proof differ
in criminal prosecutions and disciplinary proceedings; and the govern-
ment's unique burden of proof in a criminal proceeding should preclude
an acquittal from estopping the government in a disciplinary action.
Even an acquittal in a criminal proceeding does not prove the defendant's
innocence; it merely indicates that the government failed to prove the
defendant's guilt. Furthermore, even the limited indication is compro-
mised for an acquittal by the unreviewable character of a jury verdict
of not guilty. No court has the power to reverse such a verdict regardless
of its inconsistency with the evidence. Finally, regardless of the deference
given to it, a criminal proceeding can never establish more than the
employee's failure to commit a crime. It cannot show that the employee
has met employment standards, which may exceed the minimum re-
quirements of the criminal law.
A close reading of the first circuit's opinion suggests that the case
may involve a proverbial hard case that made bad law. From an evi-
dentiary standpoint, the civil service commission may have construed a
stipulation by the employee's counsel as admitting the prosecution ev-
idence in the criminal trial but not the exculpatory evidence offered by
the defense.' 64 In addition, the allegations in the dismissal letter given
to the employee did not unambiguously ground the action on the em-
ployee's misconduct rather than the criminal charges that arose out of
the misconduct.' 65 Furthermore, the record contains suggestions of racial
harassment of the defendant, who would have been the first black
supervisory employee of the Caddo Levee Board. The evidence that was
improperly excluded from the criminal trial would have tended to prove
the harassment charge. 16 Any or all of these considerations would have
justified the court in remanding the case to the civil service commission
for a decision on a complete and unambiguous record. What was not
warranted was a reversal on the merits of the employee's dismissal.
Hopefully, courts in the future will recognize the first circuit decision
as an aberration and confine it to its facts. Until that confinement
163. Caldwell v. Caddo Levee Dist., 554 So. 2d 1245, 1247 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989),
writ denied, 559 So. 2d 126 (1990).
164. Compare the majority's description of the stipulation, id. at 1247, with the one
offered by Judge Savoie's dissent. Id. at 1249-50 (Savoie, J., dissenting).
165. Paragraphs 2-4 of the dismissal letter alleged the actual drug transactions, but
Paragraph 6 referred to the employee's criminal conviction on one count of attempted
distribution. 554 So. 2d at 1246 n.2.
166. Id. at 1247.
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occurs, the opinion will unfortunately destabalize this area of law. By
suggesting that courts will occasionally ignore the distinction between
criminal prosecutions and civil service proceedings, it will offer employees
an additional-but unjustified-ground for challenging the substance of
disciplinary actions.
